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Abstract
The eighteenth century philosopher David Hume was much influenced 
by Greek philosophy and literature. His favourite writer was the satirist Lu-
cian. What is David Hume’s thanatotherapy (therapy of the fear of death)? 
Is he an Epicurean or Pyrrhonian thanatotherapist? I argue that, while he is 
in part an Epicurean who is sceptical about his Epicureanism, he is primarily 
a Lucianic thanatotherapist. A Lucianic thanatotherapist uses self and other 
deprecating irony as a form of therapy. He also ruthlessly satirises religious 
consolations. I use Hume’s deathbed allusions to Lucian’s Kataplous (float-
ing downwards) and the Dialogues of the Dead to explain my view.
Introduction
It is the year 1776. The British philosopher David Hume is on his death-
bed.  He is a major intellectual and is regarded as the chief enemy of Chris-
tianity. Theists, atheists and agnostics alike are interested in his manner of 
death. Everything he does and says will be quickly reported to the salons. 
The dogmatic Christian critic Dr Johnson sends his biographer Boswell to 
Hume, hoping for a last minute recantation (Fieser 2005, 288-291). Hume 
composes his autobiography, My Own Life for publication (Hume 1980). 
Soon after his death, Hume’s friend Adam Smith writes a letter for publica-
tion. In it, he stresses Hume’s cheerfulness and reports that Hume has been 
reading Lucian’s Dialogues of the Dead (Fieser 2005, 296-302). 
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According to Smith, Hume said that he could find no excuses he could 
give to Charon, the ferryman of the dead, for not going to Hades. “He had 
no house to finish, no daughter to provide for, he had no enemies upon 
which he wished to revenge himself”. Nevertheless, he diverted himself by 
inventing excuses to present to Charon. “ ‘Good Charon, I have been correct-
ing my works for a new edition. Allow me a little time, that I may see how 
the public receives the alterations’”. After quoting Charon politely rejecting 
this excuse saying “ ‘when you have seen the effect of these, you will be for 
making other alterations. There will be no end of such excuses’”, Hume pre-
sented his final excuse, saying “[H]ave a little patience, good Charon, I have 
been endeavouring to open the eyes of the public. If I live a few years longer, 
I may have the satisfaction of seeing the downfal of some of the prevailing 
system of superstition”. Smith reports that Hume said Charon “would lose 
all temper and decency” and say “[Y]ou loitering rogue, that will not happen 
these many hundred years. Do you fancy I will grant you a lease for so long a 
term? Get into the boat this instant, you lazy loitering rogue” (Fieser 2005, 
299-300). 
Hume’s doctor William Cullen tells of having heard a similar or the 
same story from one of Hume’s friends. The friend is perhaps Smith. How-
ever, his version of Hume’s remarks differs from what Smith reports in two 
important ways. First, he says that Hume’s excuse was that he “had been 
very busily employed in making his countrymen wiser, and particularly in 
delivering them from the Christian superstition, but that he had not com-
pleted the great work”. Second, he reports that the dialogue Hume was read-
ing and imitating was Kataplous (floating or sailing downwards), in which 
the tyrant Megapenthes (great suffering) gives his excuses for not going to 
Hades (Fieser 2005, 294).   
Annette Baier has shown that Hume was indeed imitating Megapen-
thes in Kataplous and not something from the Dialogues of the Dead (Baier 
2008, 100-110). Further, she points out that Smith, unlike Cullen, was 
timid about offending the religious establishment. It is likely that Hume re-
ferred explicitly to his project of delivering his countrymen from the Chris-
tian superstition. Indeed, in a letter he did not intend for publication, Smith 
quotes Hume as saying “[G]ood Charon, I have been endeavouring to open 
the eyes of people; have a little patience only till I have the pleasure of see-
ing the churches shut up, and the clergy sent about their business...”1. 
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The scene in Kataplous Hume was imitating is one in which Megap-
enthes gives a series of excuses for not going into Charon’s boat which are 
rejected in succession by Clotho, one of the fates. Megapenthes’ excuses are 
that he has to finish a house, to give his wife directions about buried money, 
to build a town wall and set of docks for his town, and, finally, “to live only 
long enough to subdue the Pisidians and subject the Lydians to tribute, and 
to build myself a huge mausoleum and inscribe on it all the military exploits 
of my life”. Each excuse is more hubristic than its predecessors. Comment-
ing on the final excuse, Clotho says “[W]hy, man, you are no longer asking 
for this one day, but for a stay of nearly twenty years!”. (Lucian 1915, 21)
Despite the plausibility of Baier’s argument, Hume’s remarks do not 
fit the scene in Kataplous closely. Cullen reports Hume excusing himself to 
Mercury (Hermes, not Charon), but in Kataplous Megapenthes excuses him-
self to Clotho. However, in one of Lucian’s Dialogues of the Dead, Hermes is 
involved in a discussion with two philosophers. We will see that aspects of 
that dialogue help us understand Hume’s behaviour better. Hume may well 
have had in mind both Kataplous and the Dialogues of the Dead.
Epicurean or Pyrrhonian Thanatotherapist?
The dying days of important intellectuals were imbued with significance 
in eighteenth century Europe, as indeed they were in antiquity. The dying 
person was meant to be setting an example through word and deed (Miller 
2001). Much that has been published about Hume makes clear that he con-
formed to his role. Various people noted his remarkable composure and his 
attempt to calm his friends in the face of his impending death. He clearly was 
trying to imply that being dead is of no great importance. It is also clear that 
he would have expected his behaviour and his words to be widely reported. 
What was he trying to say by imitating characters in Lucian?
Hume was a central figure of the enlightenment. He is now known as 
a philosopher. However, in his time he was known principally as the author 
of a popular History of England. Through much of his work Hume criticised 
religious, and in particular, Christian claims. Recently, Paul Russell has ar-
gued that Hume was in part a modern Lucretian; a follower of the Greek 
philosopher Epicurus, whose views are best known via his Roman disciple 
Lucretius.  Epicurus is well known for his criticisms of the role of pagan 
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religion in human life. For Russell, Hume’s philosophy and history were 
intended as part of an Epicurean style program of liberation from Christian-
ity (Russell 2008).
Martha Nussbaum and others have shown that Epicurus thought that 
philosophy is a form of therapy by means of rational argument - it aims 
to liberate us from troubled emotional states of mind by helping us attain 
ataraxia, mental tranquillity (literally absence of emotional disturbance). 
Indeed, Epicurus declares that “Empty are the words of that philosopher 
who offers therapy for no human suffering. For just as there is no use for 
medical expertise if it does not give therapy for bodily diseases, so too there 
is no use in philosophy if it does not expel the suffering of the soul” (Epi-
curus 1987, 155). On Epicurus’ account, an irrational fear of death blights 
our lives and leads us into religious belief that empowers priests to terrify 
us and manipulate us. Epicurean philosophy aims to liberate us from the 
dangerous influence of religion principally via making us see that the fear 
of death is irrational. Thanatotherapeia is a central element in Epicureanism 
(Nussbaum 1994; 13-15, 195-238).
A striking feature of Epicureanism is its reversal of common judge-
ments about materialism. It is common to believe that the religious person 
is in a more hopeful situation than the materialist as she believes in a life af-
ter death. By contrast, in a letter he wrote shortly before his death, the ma-
terialist Epicurus argued that “that most frightful of evils, death, is nothing 
to us, seeing that when we exist death is not present, and when death is 
present we do not exist” (Epicurus 1987, 150). That is, as we have ceased to 
exist when we are dead, death cannot be bad for us. Indeed, nothing can be 
good or bad for us when we have ceased to exist. On the Epicurean story, 
once we realise this we can begin the process of liberating ourselves from 
religion. This means that we can re-organise our lives to enjoy the present 
rather than organising it around a non-existent future.
It is also common to believe that religious people will be better peo-
ple, but Epicureans try to reverse this judgement. They think that fear of 
death not only allows us to be manipulated by money-grubbing and fanati-
cal priests - it can also lead us to engage in a senseless and dangerous desire 
to pile up enormous wealth and to conquer others to leave absurd posthu-
mous monuments to ourselves (Lucretius 1999; 5, 71-2). Epicureans claim 
that, by contrast, they pursue only very moderate wealth and power as they 
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see that the pursuit of these things is pointless. We will never live to enjoy 
them, and what happens after our death is of no relevance to our welfare. 
Now Russell does not claim that Hume strictly followed Epicurean 
doctrine. Indeed, as he notes, Hume was attracted to ancient scepticism 
both as a philosophy and as a therapy (Russell 2008, 204-222). The ancient 
sceptics wanted to attain ataraxia, but they wanted to attain it in a different 
way to the more dogmatic Epicureans. Our best account of the strategy of 
ancient sceptics for attaining ataraxia comes from the sceptical disciple of 
the Greek philosopher Pyrrho, Sextus Empiricus. Sextus says that “scepti-
cism is an ability to place in antithesis, in any manner whatever, appearanc-
es and judgements, and thus - because of the equality of force in the objects 
and arguments opposed - to come first of all to a suspension of judgement 
and then to mental tranquillity [ataraxia]” (Sextus Empiricus 1985, 32-33). 
So if he were trying to deal with someone’s fear of death, the Pyrrhonian 
might put equal arguments for and against a benign afterlife to her until 
she reached a suspense of judgement, thereby eliminating much of her fear. 
Hume is, however, critical of Pyrrhonism. In his Treatise he argues 
that the state of mind “that fantastic sect” want to attain is unattainable 
(Hume 2007, 123). In an anonymous pamphlet that defends his views, he 
calls Pyrrhonism “a kind of Jeux d’Esprit”. He declares that, unlike Pyrrhoni-
ans, he merely wishes “to abate the pride of mere human reasoners, by show-
ing them, that even with principles which seem the clearest … they are not 
able to attain a full consistence and absolute certainty” (Hume 2007, 425). 
The point is elaborated in his first Enquiry (Hume 2000, 119-121). Never-
theless, he does seem to want his method of pursuing philosophy to be one 
which involves something like ataraxia. He describes himself later in the 
Treatise as wanting to “contribute a little to the advancement of knowledge, 
by giving in some particulars a different turn to the speculations of philoso-
phers, and pointing out to them more distinctly those subjects, where alone 
they can expect assurance and conviction”. He notes that if this manner of 
doing philosophy comes more into fashion, he can avoid both spleen and 
indolence. He appeals to the reader who finds himself in the “same easy dis-
position” to follow his future speculations. He claims that “[T]he conduct of 
a man, who studies philosophy in this careless manner, is more truly scepti-
cal than that of one, who feeling an inclination to it, is yet so over-whelm’d 
with doubts and scruples as to totally reject it. A true sceptic will be diffi-
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dent of his philosophical doubts, as well of his philosophical conviction; and 
will never refuse any innocent satisfaction, which offers itself, upon account 
of either of them” (Hume 2007, 177)2.  
Baier points out that when Hume uses “careless”, he does not use it 
in the sense of not giving a damn, but in the eighteenth century sense of 
pursuing life and letters without unnecessary cares brought on by an over-
wrought imagination (Baier, 1991, 1-27).  So it seems as if Hume saw him-
self as a true sceptic who sees one of the advantages of his scepticism to be 
the careless pursuit of innocent intellectual satisfaction. The carelessness 
is not a result of considering opposing arguments, but a way of pursuing 
philosophy.
Despite what I have said in the previous three paragraphs, Hume’s 
remarks to Boswell are Epicurean. Boswell reports that Hume “said flatly 
that the morality of every religion was bad, and, I really thought, was not 
jocular when he said that when he heard a man was religious, he concluded 
he was a rascal, though he had known some instances of very good men be-
ing religious”. In responding to Boswell, Hume also produced a variant of a 
Lucretian argument, often called the symmetry argument. (The symmetry 
argument is the argument that if being dead is bad for us, so too is the mere 
fact that we were not born earlier. The reason is that the loss of life is sym-
metrical at both ends of a life. Being born earlier would give us a longer life 
just as living longer with the same birth date. However, no rational person 
would be filled with woe at the mere fact of not being born earlier. Hence, 
it is irrational to fear being dead (Lucretius 1999, 96-97; Nussbaum 1994, 
203).) Boswell reports that he “asked him [Hume] if the thought of annihi-
lation never gave him any uneasiness. He said not the least; no more than 
if he had not been, as Lucretius observes” (Fieser 2005, 288-289). Hume 
stressed that he has no fear of being dead and no belief in an after life. 
Hume’s making himself into an exemplar also reflects Epicurean prac-
tice. Epicurus is well known for having written letters to his disciples that 
he intended for release to a broader public about how well he was dying. 
Hume’s composure in the face of death and his attempts to calm his friends 
fit the Epicurean life style (Long and Sedley 1987, 149-151).
Does what I have said above support the view that Hume is a Lucre-
tian who pursues Lucretian aims in a “careless” manner? Hume’s remarks to 
Boswell should be put into context. Hume would have known that Boswell 
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was sent by the orthodox Christian Dr Johnson who hoped for a last minute 
recantation by a man he saw as a dangerous atheist. Playing the role of an 
extreme Lucretian would have been a way of sending up Johnson. While 
Lucretians want to eliminate the influence of religious beliefs, we will see 
that Hume indicates that he thinks that it is unlikely or impossible, even if 
he feels it to be desirable3.
In any case, Hume’s other remarks to Boswell indicate a degree of self-
mockery which is not consistent with the serious role of a Lucretian. Epi-
curus and his followers converted Epicureanism into a soteriological cult. 
Their stance was hardly “careless”, and there is nothing of sceptical doubt, 
let alone humour or self-mockery, in it. Indeed, without a trace of irony, 
Lucretius goes so far as to say that Epicurus is worthy of being a god (Lucre-
tius 1999, 138)4. Boswell reports that he asked Hume “if it is not possible 
that there might be a future state. He answered it was possible that a piece 
of coal put on the fire would not burn; and he added that it was a most un-
reasonable fancy that we should exist forever…” (Fieser 2005, 288). Careful 
readers of Hume will understand. Hume struggles through much of book 1 
of his Treatise to explain how inductive inferences can be proved. He argues 
in detail that the fact that every piece of coal we have encountered so far 
burns cannot prove that a future piece of coal will burn, nor can it be shown 
to make it probable that a future piece of coal will burn. He also stresses in 
Book 1 that he cannot show an inductive inference to be even reasonable. 
Rather, on his account, inductive inferences themselves rely on the imagi-
nation, that is, on what he calls “a seemingly trivial property of the fancy” 
– while objecting to Boswell’s “fancy” he cannot show Boswell wrong by us-
ing reason alone (Hume 2007, 174). Boswell failed to understand the irony.
So is Hume playing the role of an Epicurean with a whiff of careless 
scepticism about his Epicureanism? Is that his thanatotherapy? I will argue 
that this is too simple. He is, rather, a Lucianic thanatotherapist.
Hume and Lucian
When talking to his close friend Smith, Hume imitates Lucian. This 
is not peripheral to Hume’s life and thought. Some years before, the Abbe´ 
Morellet, a friend of Hume, sent his French translation of one of Lucian’s 
dialogues to Hume seeking his opinion about the quality of the translation. 
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In his letter, he described Lucian as Hume’s favourite author (Grieg 1939; 
157-8, footnote 1). There are also many references to Lucian in Hume’s pub-
lished work. We also know that he admired Jonathan Swift who in turn 
imitated parts of Lucian5. Nevertheless, Hume’s admiration of Swift was 
qualified by comparison to his admiration of Lucian. Understanding the 
ways in which it was qualified gives us a better understanding of the nature 
and style of Hume’s satire.
In one of his essays, Hume describes Swift as the author of “the first 
polite prose” in English, though the praise is somewhat backhanded, as he 
makes clear that he thinks French and Classical authors are far superior to 
many of those writing in English (Hume 1987, 91). In a letter he says that 
he “can often laugh with” Swift and “can even approve” of his style, but sure-
ly “can never admire” it. “It has no harmony, no eloquence, no ornament, 
not much correctness, whatever the English may imagine” (Grieg 1939, 
194). Another limitation Hume sees in Swift is that Swift takes his priestly 
role far too seriously.  In another letter, Hume says “I have frequently had 
it in my intentions to write a supplement to Gulliver, containing the ridi-
cule of priests. Twas certainly a pity that Swift was a parson. Had he been 
a lawyer or physician, we had nevertheless been entertain’d at the expense 
of these professions. But priests are so jealous, that they cannot bear to be 
touch’d on that head; and for a plain reason: Because they are conscious that 
they are really ridiculous. That part of the Doctor’s subject is so fertile, that 
a much inferior genius, I am confident, might succeed in it” (Grieg 1932, 
153)6. These remarks give us clues as to Hume’s satire. Its object is primarily 
religion and it is more classical than that of Swift. Lucian is more of a model 
for him than Swift.
Who was Lucian? Lucian of Samosata was an influential second centu-
ry satirist. He was very much a figure of the so-called second sophistic, a lit-
erary movement in the Eastern part of the Roman Empire that wrote in the 
Attic of the 5th and 4th centuries BCE. It peppered its work with allusions to 
classical Greek literature and imitated its style. While Lucian knew classical 
Greek literature well, it has been very plausibly argued that his central con-
cern is contemporary life. One of his central targets is frauds and hypocrites 
of various kinds, particularly religious frauds and hypocrites (Jones 1986).
Hume showed a particular interest in one of Lucian’s critiques of a 
religious fraud, his Alexander the false prophet (Alexandros i Pseudomantis), 
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which is the story of how Lucian exposed the various frauds of the false pa-
gan miracle worker Alexander of Aboneteichos (Lucian 1925). It is useful in 
understanding Hume’s allusive uses of Lucian to examine his use of Lucian’s 
Alexander in his “Of Miracles”. 
Hume points out that it is useful for a religious impostor to start his 
impostures in a remote and ignorant place. By the time the story arrives at 
a place with wiser people it will have been magnified and better information 
will be difficult to find. So it was, according to Hume, that Alexander was able 
to proceed gradually to Rome itself with his impostures. He now argues “[B]
ut had Alexander fixed his residence at Athens, the philosophers of that re-
nowned mart of learning had immediately spread, throughout the Roman em-
pire, their sense of the matter; which, being supported by so great an author-
ity, and displayed by all the force of reason and eloquence, had entirely opened 
the eyes of mankind. It is true; Lucian passing by chance through Paphlagonia, 
had an opportunity of performing this good office. But though much to be 
wished, it does not always happen that every Alexander meets with a Lucian, 
ready to expose and detect his impostures” (Hume 2000, 90-91).
Some readers of these remarks in Hume’s time would have been well 
aware that Jesus’s miracles were reported from Judaea, a relatively ignorant 
and backward part of the Roman Empire. Further, as far as we know, there 
was no Lucian to investigate Jesus’s miracles. Hume has implied that those 
miracles might well have been fraudulent without mentioning Jesus7. 
There is, however, a slyer strategy involved in Hume’s remarks on 
miracles. This becomes clear when we read a part of it that was cut out of 
some later editions, perhaps because it made the point too obvious. The 
section says “[I]t may, perhaps, be objected, that I proceed rashly, and form 
my notions of Alexander merely from the account, given by him of Lucian, 
a profess’d enemy. It were indeed to be wish’d, that some of the accounts 
publish’d by his followers and accomplices had remained. The opposition 
and contrast betwixt the character and conduct of the same man, as drawn 
by a friend or an enemy, is as strong, even in common life, much more in 
these religious matters, as that betwixt any two men in the world, betwixt 
Alexander and St Paul for instance” (Hume 2000, 175). 
To Hume’s largely Protestant audience, St Paul is a central figure in 
Christianity. Yet all we have about St Paul is written by himself or by his 
followers and possible accomplices. We do not have an account by written 
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by one of his enemies.  Neither do we have an unbiased and rigorously re-
searched account. Further, Hume has stressed that had Alexander started 
his impostures in Athens, he would have been exposed. Readers of Hume’s 
time would have known that even according to the writings of his acolyte 
who produced the Acts of the Apostles, Paul’s preaching in Athens before an 
audience which included Epicurean and Stoic philosophers was hardly re-
ceived with uniform enthusiasm. Some treated him as a babbler or scoffed 
at him (Acts, 17.18, 17.32). Although the author of Acts describes many 
supposed miracles produced by Paul, even he does not describe a Pauline 
miracle in Athens. Paul, of course, also started his preaching in a relatively 
ignorant and backward part of the Roman Empire. The implication is obvi-
ous. Just as we have no account that defends Alexander from Lucian, we 
have no account that criticises Paul to place against the account of Paul’s 
Christian acolytes. Had Paul started his miracle working and preaching in 
Athens, he would likely have been exposed as a fraud.
I should emphasise, however, Hume shows pretty clearly elsewhere 
that he does not want to totally undermine an established religion, even 
if it is as preposterous as Christianity. Consider a remark Hume makes in 
his History of England. In discussing the reformation, he considers the issue 
of whether there should be state funded established religion. He consid-
ers the argument that just as artisans improve their goods in a free market 
economy, religion would be improved if there were a free market in religious 
preaching. However, he rejects the claim, arguing that what will happen is 
that “[E]ach ghostly practitioner, in order to render himself more precious 
and sacred in the eyes of his retainers, will inspire them with the most vio-
lent abhorrence of all other sects, and continually endeavour, by some nov-
elty, to excite the languid devotion of his audience. No regard will be paid 
to truth, morals, or decency, in the doctrines inculcated. Every tenet will 
be adopted that best suits the disorderly affections of the human frame. 
Customers will be drawn to each conventicle by new industry and address 
in practising on the passions and the credulity of the populace. And, in the 
end, the civil magistrate will find, that he has dearly paid for his pretended 
frugality, in saving a fixed establishment of the priests; and that, in reality 
the most decent and advantageous composition, which he can make with 
the spiritual guides, is to bribe their indolence, by assigning stated salaries 
to their profession, and rendering it superfluous for them to be farther ac-
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tive, than merely to prevent their flock from straying in quest of new pas-
tures. And in this manner ecclesiastical establishments, though commonly 
they arose at first from religious views, prove in the end advantageous to 
the political interests of society” (Hume, 1778, 90-91)8. 
Baier has emphasised the extent to which Hume is willing to praise 
religious hypocrisy for some greater good. As she notes after a survey of 
various comments in Hume’s history, he thinks religious sincerity is often 
more dangerous than religious hypocrisy (Baier 2008, 35-99). Indeed, in 
his history, Hume is also hypocritical. In his discussion of Charles I of Eng-
land, he is wary of explicitly stating that doctrines that make the person of 
the monarch sacred are false. He states “[T]hat illusion, if it be an illusion, 
which teaches us to pay a sacred regard to the persons of princes, is so salu-
tary, that to dissipate it by the formal trial and punishment of a sovereign, 
will have a more pernicious effects on the people, than the example of jus-
tice can be supposed to have a beneficial effect on princes, by checking their 
career of tyranny” (Hume 1778a, 545). Careful readers of various works of 
Hume would conclude that Hume must think that the view that the persons 
of princes are sacred is an illusion. Indeed, in his essay “Of the Original Con-
tract”, Hume quite clearly says that “Almost all governments, which exist 
at present, or of which there remains any record in story, have been found-
ed originally, either on usurpation or conquest, or both ...” (Hume 1987, 
471). He also explains how the illusion of legitimacy and sacredness arises 
through habituation and various artifices. 
As we can see from one of his letters, Hume does not apply this praise 
of religious hypocrisy merely to matters of state. James Edmonstoune 
wrote to Hume about a Mr Vivian. He says that Mr Vivian may be able to 
get a good living by taking a Bishoprick. However, Vivian now apparently 
thinks he ought not to take it because of his religious scepticism. Edmon-
stoune describes Vivian as a “sort of disciple” of Hume who has “given him 
notions not very consistent with his priestly character” (Grieg 1939, 353-
4). He asks Hume to advise Vivian. Hume advises Edmonstoune to tell Mr 
Vivian to take the Bishoprick because “civil employments for men of letters 
can scarcely be found...” He continues “It is putting too great a respect on 
the vulgar, and on their superstitions, to pique one’s self on sincerity with 
regard to them ... If the thing were worthy of being treated gravely, I should 
tell him that the Pythian oracle, with the approbation of Xenophon, advised 
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everyone to worship the gods - nomo poleos [ie according to the customs 
of one’s community]. I wish it was still in my power to be a hypocrite in 
this particular. The common duties of society usually require it; and the ec-
clesiastical profession only adds a little more to an innocent dissimulation, 
or rather simulation, without which it is impossible to pass through the 
world” (Grieg 1932, 439). Citing Apollo’s oracle as an authority to a poten-
tial Christian bishop is laced with irony; particularly when coupled with the 
conditional “[I]f the thing were worthy of being treated gravely”. Neverthe-
less, the remarks Hume makes about the place of religion in society indi-
cate that he is ironically serious.  As Baier says, “Hume’s attitude to religion 
and established religion is a mix of realism, irony, despair, and moral satire” 
(Baier 2008, 96).
Lucian may have influenced Hume’s attitude to religion, though there 
is no sign of despair in Lucian. Hume lived in a world recently devastated by 
religious fanatics. Lucian did not. Some scholars have been puzzled by Lu-
cian’s On the Syrian Goddess (Peri tis Syrihs Theou), in which he apparently 
quite credulously describes miracles, while elsewhere regarding such stories 
as absurd. Yet Lucian elsewhere provides a key to the puzzle. In The Lover 
of Lies, or the Doubter (Filopseudis i Apiston), two characters both marvel at 
lies, particularly lies told by the superstitious. It turns out that the lies that 
they think are bad are those that are useless or outright fraudulent.  Lies 
told “to deceive the enemy, or a matter of life and death” are excused (Lucian 
1961a, 196). Further, poets who seek to seduce with fables are excused, as 
are liars who “tell such stories from patriotic motives. Besides if you abol-
ished such stories throughout Greece, all the official guides would starve to 
death, for foreign tourists (xenoi) have no wish to hear the truth about any-
thing, even if they’re not paying for it” (Lucian 1961a, 198). Lucian is a pa-
triotic Syrian who is willing to fudge the truth a little for patriotic motives. 
In any case, Lucian gives the game away to the intelligent reader by writing 
On the Syrian Goddess as a parody of Herodotus written in Herodotus’s Ionic 
dialect9. Literary figures of Lucian’s own time wrote in Attic Greek. (Herodo-
tus has been regarded by many as an arch liar (e.g. Plutarch 1965)). 
Lucian’s strategy in On the Syrian Goddess is similar to the much more 
explicit strategy that he adopts in A True Story (Alethon Dihgimaton), in 
which he distinguishes himself from all the other liars by telling the truth 
that he is lying. He there says “I myself thanks to my vanity, was eager to 
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hand something down to posterity, that I might not be the only one exclud-
ed from the privileges of poetic licence, and as I had nothing true to tell, not 
having had any adventures of any significance, I took to lying. But my lying 
is far more honest than theirs, for although I tell the truth in nothing else, I 
shall at least be truthful in saying that I am a liar” (Lucian 1913, 253). Nev-
ertheless, in a later part of A True Story, he encounters liars on the isle of the 
damned, including Herodotus, and he comments “[O]n seeing them, I had 
good hopes for the future, for I have never told a lie that I know of” (Lucian 
1913, 337).  He thereby damns himself by lying about his earlier admission 
that he is lying. He also undermines his lying claim to have encountered 
Herodotus et al in the isle of the damned - in this way, he undermines his 
claim to having demonstrated that Herodotus is a liar while still asserting it.
A shallow reader of On the Syrian Goddess might take it to be an old 
fashioned patriotic work or perhaps a genuine arcane text. (Lucian seems to 
have written fake ancient philosophical texts to trap pretentious scholars 
(Jones 1986, 19).) A subtle reader would get the parody while indulging 
herself in some harmless patriotism.
Lucian shows himself to be sympathetic to Epicureanism. However, 
there is little sign that he is an Epicurean. The philosopher he presents most 
sympathetically is the Cynic Menippus, who wrote centuries before Lucian 
(Jones 1986, 26-32). In the Double Indictment (Dis Kategouremenos) Lu-
cian puts into the mouth of Dialogue, one of his two accusers, the claim 
that on top of his many insults to Dialogue, “he even dug up and thrust 
upon me Menippus, a prehistoric dog (palaion kynon), with a very loud 
bark, it seems, and sharp fangs, a really dreadful dog who bites unexpect-
edly because he grins when he bites” (Lucian 1921, 147). In his Dialogues of 
the Dead, Lucian presents Menippus as eager to go to the land of the dead 
and to satirise villains who want to avoid punishment. Menippus also sends 
up various human vanities as preposterous in the light of death. Menippus 
does not appear in Kataplous, but Cyniscus (puppy) appears. Lucian often 
seems to take up a Menippean role.
Lucianic Thanatotherapy
We understand Hume better by understanding his allusion to Kata-
plous and his Lucianic techniques. Hume dug up a prehistoric dog in the 
form of Lucian, though he here uses it in part to bite himself. Let me remind 
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the reader: in Kataplous, the tyrant Megapenthes tries to talk Clotho (one of 
the fates) out of shoving him into Charon’s boat by stressing his important 
plans. Clotho is outraged that he will want nearly twenty years. In Smith’s 
published version of the story about Hume’s death, Hume says that he will 
tell Charon he wants to open up the eyes of the public about the prevailing 
superstition. Charon annoyedly tells him “that will not happen these many 
hundred years” and tells him to get into the boat (Fieser 2005, 300).
Hume’s tyrannical attempt to hang on to life by bringing about the 
downfall of the Christian religion is shown to be absurd. First, it is more 
impossible to complete than Megapenthes’ hubristic projects. It will, at best, 
take hundreds of years. Second, materialists should not be worried about dy-
ing, so it is hypocritical of Hume to hang on to life indefinitely. Third, elimi-
nating religion is something no true sceptic would aim at. Hume plays both 
the role of Megapenthes and of the god who, by divine intervention, pre-
vents him from causing further great suffering. He thereby is forced by liter-
ary divine intervention to see through Epicurean soteriology and take up the 
role of a “true sceptic” who enjoys the advantages of “careless” scepticism.
We get a greater insight into Hume’s thanatotherapy by considering 
the behaviour of Menippus in Lucian. Menippus delights in bringing out 
the absurd vanities of the vain and powerful. However, Lucian not only does 
that through Menippus. He also brings out how meaningless the vanities 
of ordinary people are in Hades by depicting them in their final state. The 
beautiful are now mere skulls. The strong now have no muscles. And so on. 
There is a lovely section of Lucian’s Dialogues of the Dead in which Menippus 
is sending up a pompous and corrupt philosopher who has to strip off his 
vanities. In response, the philosopher tells him to strip off his independ-
ence, plain speaking, nobility, laughter and cheerfulness - presumably be-
cause they are also meaningless in Hades. Hermes, however, tells Menippus 
that he should keep these things, as they are useful to us in floating down 
(kataploun) because they all carry well (eufora) (Lucian 1961, 112-115). 
Hermes’s speech has a touch of irony; for his praise of Menippus’s character 
traits is coupled with him calling them koufa - which can mean buoyant, but 
literally means empty or hollow. So it may be that there is a divine joke here 
at Menippus’s expense10. Note that, in any case, we are not being told that 
these character traits are useful when we arrive, for nothing is useful when 
we arrive. That, however, does not matter for we have ceased to exist.
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Afterword
Is Hume right? To decide that question, we would have to engage in 
further discussion. We would also have to try his thanatotherapy. Will we 
dare to try it?
Notes
1  In his letter, Smith has Hume saying things that are very close to Kataplous, except that he 
says that Hume talked about three ghosts in Lucian pleading for more time. In Kataplous, only 
Megapenthes’s ghost pleads for more time (Mossner and Ross, 1977 203-4).
2  Potkay argues that one of Hume’s primary aims is to be a therapist in the Hellenistic 
tradition (Potkay 2000, 12-16). However, in a dialogue Potkay quotes, Hume puts into the 
mouth of “The Sceptic” an argument against the therapeutic power of philosophy. He then 
puts an argument for its therapeutic power in a footnote correcting “The Sceptic”. Hume was 
probably ambivalent on the matter (Hume 1987; 169, 177 footnote 17).
3  Perhaps in this respect Hume is closer to Epicurus than the fanatically anti-religious 
Lucretius. Epicurus, perhaps as a way of deflecting attacks on his supposed atheism, trod a 
fine line on the existence of the gods and the value of religious ceremonies (Long and Sedley 
1987, 144-149).
4  For a jaundiced view of Epicureanism, see Green 1990, 618-630. For a more nuanced 
discussion, see Mistsis 2003, 467-471. Hume would not have known the details, but would 
have been aware of Lucretius’s nauseating attitude to Epicurus.
5  The library of Baron Hume, Hume’s nephew, contained a 12 volume edition of Jonathan 
Swift published in 1736. It had probably previously belonged to Hume (Norton and Norton 
1996; 131, number 1227).
6  For a discussion of Hume’s satiric style and his relation to Swift and Lucian, see Ross 1995 
and Phiddian 2011. Those authors underestimate the degree to which Hume distances his 
style and targets from those of Swift.
7   I am using the notion of implying here to mean what Grice, in a wonderful turn of phrase, 
calls “implicating” (Levinson 1983, 97-118).
8  Hume is careful to say that he excepts the true religion from his remarks, but that is 
something he had to say to get his work published and read.
9  The arcane style is captured in Harmon’s translation of Lucian into the style of the fake 
fourteenth century traveller John Mandeville (Lucian 1925a).
10  Lucian’s (and Hume’s?) point here may be similar to one Thomas Nagel makes in a discussion 
of the absurdity of human life. He says “[I]f sub specie aeternitatis there is no reason to believe 
anything matters, then that doesn’t matter either, and we can approach our absurd lives with 
irony instead of heroism or despair” (Nagel 1981, 161). Joel Relihan seems to be correct in 
arguing that Menippus’s (and Lucian’s?) own vanities are in part the target of the Dialogues of 
the Dead (Relihan 1987).
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